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THE WORLD BANK GROUP
INTRODUCTION
The World Bank Group consists of three affiliated organizations: the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the
International Development Association (IDA), and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC).1 The IBRD and the IDA together consti-
tute the World Bank.2 Lawyers3 and economists work in tandem to ef-
fect the Bank's central purpose, namely to promote economic and social
progress in developing nations. The IFC also advances the same pur-
pose by investing in commercial enterprises in developing countries.'
Together, these institutions engage in a variety of projects to serve as a
catalyst to stimulate investments. 5
This section discusses significant legal developments within the
World Bank Group. Part I focuses on current commercial activities in-
cluding a detailed discussion of the new cofinancing initiative. Part II
discusses several controversies arising from World Bank lending pro-
grams. Part III reviews recent changes in World Bank membership,
administration and legal affairs.
1. See generally WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
CORPORATION (Apr. 1985) (providing discussion of each organization's history and
role); J. TAYLOR, A LAWYER'S VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD BANK COFINANC-
ING WITH PRIVATE BANKS (Feb. 1984) (stating that the World Bank Group is the
world's largest multilateral development aid agency and the largest non-residcnt bor-
rower in virtually all countries in which it borrows).
2. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORA-
TION 3 (Apr. 1985).
3. The World Bank's Legal Department, comprised of approximately seventy attor-
neys from thirty-three countries, is headed by I.F. Shihata of Egypt. Interview with
Louis Forget, Legal Advisor, Policy and General Affairs, World Bank, in Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 19, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Forget Interview I]. The IFC has twenty-
four attorneys in its own legal department. Written responses to questions of Jane D.
Weaver by Bill Brannigan, World Bank Information and Public Affairs Office (Dec.
20, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brannigan Responses I] (available at the editorial of-
fices of the American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Washington,
D.C.).
4. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORA-
TION 3 (Apr. 1985).
5. Another legally complex World Bank development-the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA)-is discussed in this issue by I.F. Shihata, Vice President
and General Counsel of the World Bank. See I.F. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes
Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of the World Bank, with Particular Refer-
ence to ICSID and MIGA, 1 Abi. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 97 (1986).
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I. CURRENT WORLD BANK COMMERCIAL LENDING
ACTIVITIES
A. SOURCES OF WORLD BANK FUNDING
1. Interest on Investments, Loan Repayments and Loan Sales
The World Bank has several sources of income for funding develop-
ment projects. The primary sources of income include paid-in capital of
its member countries, borrowings on world capital markets, and net in-
come from its operations. 6 Although the World Bank derives a substan-
tial portion of its income from these three sources, these funds are not
sufficient to meet the increased worldwide need for development
financing.
The World Bank supplements its income by selling participation.
rights in the Bank's loan portfolio to private parties or other public
entities. This program entitles public or private purchasers to receive
part of the scheduled loan repayments that borrowing countries owe to.
the Bank.7 The purpose of the program is to generate funds from
outside sources for development projects, thereby reducing the Bank's
reliance on direct contributions from World Bank member countries.8
In 1985, the Bank initiated a pilot program to sell up to $300 million
in outstanding World Bank loans.9 At least seventeen countries already
agreed to the sale of their loans, and so far, in twenty-three transac-
tions, the Bank completed sales of over $120 million of fixed rate loans
made before 1980.10 The Bank will analyze the role of loan sales in its
funding strategy in the fall of 1986.11 The results achieved in this pilot
program should complement the member nations' upcoming negotia-
tions for a general capital increase.
6. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 4; Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1986, at 37, col. 1 (not-
ing that the World Bank made a record profit of $695 million in fiscal year 1985).
7. Brannigan Responses 1, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. WORLD BANK, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (1985) [hereinafter cited as WORLD
BANK ANNUAL REPORT]. In earlier years, the Bank sold loans worth $3 billion to more
than 600 commercial banks, institutional investors and government agencies. In 1980,
however, high market interest rates, contrasted with the lower rate of interest on World
Bank loans, led the Bank to discontinue the program. Brannigan Responses I, supra
note 3.




2. Negotiations for a General Capital Increase
a. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) relies on general capital increases to expand its lending capac-
ity and to fund development projects throughout the world. At the
1985 annual meeting, the Board of Governors agreed to begin negotia-
tions for a general capital increase. The Bank previously authorized
such an increase in January 1980.12
The Bank's member countries must resolve several issues before au-
thorizing a general capital increase.13 First, they must reach a consen-
sus on the Bank's future financial needs, which are largely dependent
on the Bank's projected role in world financial markets.14 Second, the
Bank's members must determine how much of the capital increase each
country must pay immediately, how much may be left on call, and
which national currencies will be acceptable for payment of the capital
increase. Third, the question of the valuation of the Bank's capital
must be resolved. Finally, the members must address the important le-
gal issue of preemptive rights.'5 At the time of this writing, the Bank
12. E. ROTBERG, THE WORLD BANK: A FINANCIAL APPRAISAL 25 (1981) (availa-
ble at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
13. Forg6t Interview I, supra note 3.
14. See Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. I (noting that one plan for the
Bank's future, proposed by United States Secretary of the Treasury James Baker, calls
for the IBRD to increase its lending by fifty percent over the next three years, from S6
billion to $9 billion). Almost all of this proposed increase would be earmarked for
structural adjustment loans. Id. See also infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing structural adjustment loans).
15. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, art. 11(3), 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No.
1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter cited as IBRD Articles]. Preemptive rights permit
IBRD members to purchase additional shares when the Bank increases its authorized
capital, thereby allowing them to keep their rank and relative power. Forg6t Interview
I, supra note 3. The IBRD uses International Monetary Fund (IMF) quotas, calcu-
lated on the basis of certain economic parameters, to determine a member's IBRD
capital subscription as well as the allocation of optional shares the country can
purchase. Brannigan Responses I, supra note 3. The IMF quota system and the related
IBRD capital structure are significant because they determine the ranking of IBRD
members. Relative positions of influence, such as voting power, for the most part, are
based on a country's number of shares. Each member automatically receives 250 votes,
plus one additional vote for each share of capital subscription purchased. IBRD Arti-
cles, supra at art. V(3). As a country's IMF quota changes, the IBRD accordingly
adjusts allocations for increased capitalization shares. DEVELOPMENT COmINMrIrEE, 2
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ISSUES: REPORTS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE VORLD BANK
TO THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE 58 (1985) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE] (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.). For example, Japan's
IMF quota increased so much that the Bank repeatedly authorized it to purchase addi-
tional IBRD shares. Id. As a result, by September 1984, Japan became the second
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had not yet announced a definite time and place for the general capital
increase negotiations.1 6
b. Capital Increases in the International Finance Corporation
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is expected to double
its assets over the next five years from $0.6-billion to $1.3 billion.17
Ninety of the 127 IFC members already approved the increase. Six
more members must approve the increase before it can be
implemented.18
The IFC must increase its lending capacity in order to meet the in-
creased demand for funds from its member countries. In fiscal year
1985, IFC-approved investments increased by fifty-six percent despite
the unfavorable climate for private enterprise in many of the IFC's de-
veloping member countries. The investment levels were the highest
achieved since the IFC's founding. 19 Presently, IFC investments involve
approximately $709 million in seventy developing countries. The IFC
approved seventy-five loans and investments in thirty-eight countries in
fiscal year 1985, totalling an additional $937.2 million. ° In one of
these loans, the IFC undertook its first ever assisted investment of pri-
vate foreign capital in China.21
c. Capital Increases in the International Development Association
The International Development Association (IDA) projects its needs
for three years in advance, negotiates the required replenishment with
the member countries, and then collects the contributions of the mem-
ber countries.2 2 The IDA began negotiations in Paris in January 1986
largest IBRD shareholder, surpassing West Germany, France, and Great Britain. Be-
cause a decline in voting power is a concern to many IBRD members, they heavily
negotiate the use of IMF quotas and the preemptive rights issue prior to finalizing new
capitalization increases. Forg6t Interview I, supra note 3.
16. Brannigan Responses I, supra note 3.
17. Washington Post, Sept. 26, 1985, at E3, col. 1.
18. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1985).
19. Id. at 2, 4.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at 4. The investment agreement calls for a joint Chinese-French venture to
produce small, lightweight trucks in Guangzhou. Ten percent of the equity from this
investment will be offered for sale to the Chinese public. Id.
22. DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 35. The eighth replenishment pe-
riod is referred to as IDA 8. Id. For IDA 7, although $16 billion was proposed, only $9
billion was subscribed from the member countries, largely because the United States
decreased its annual contribution to $750 million from $1 billion the previous year. Id.
In light of the United States position, many other countries also declined to increase
their contributions. Id. As a result, IDA 7 represented a decline of twenty-four percent
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for its eighth three-year replenishment. In 1985, the Reagan Adminis-
tration indicated that it would urge the United States Congress to ap-
prove an increase in the United States IDA subscription.2 3 Encouraged
by this development, Congress voted to contribute $75 million for a
separate aid project-the World Bank Special Facility for Africa--on
December 19, 1985. In January 1986, however, the Reagan Adminis-
tration announced that it would withhold the special contribution until
it could determine the effect of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act2' on
the United States budget.25 Thus, the United States may not increase
its IDA subscription as anticipated.
B. WORLD BANK LENDING PROGRAMS
1. Current Loan Terms: Modified System of Floating Interest Rates
and Favorable Repayment Periods
The Bank changed from a system of fixed interest rate loans to a
modified system of floating interest rates in July 1982.20 Under this
new system, the Bank adjusts the interest rates charged on loans quar-
terly according to guidelines related to the Bank's cost of borrowing.
2 7
In the third quarter of fiscal year 1986, the rate was down to 8.5 per-
cent, well below existing commercial rates.28 In addition to offering in-
terest rates lower than commercial rates, IBRD loans offer repayment
periods of fifteen to twenty years and grace periods of up to five
years.29 In 1985, the Bank also eliminated its /4 percent front end han-
dling fee on loans in an effort to entice more loan applications following
a drop in the IBRD loan volume."0
in real terms from average annual commitment levels. Id.
23. Id.
24. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings Act), Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1986).
25. Washington Post, Mar. 13, 1986, at El, col. 2.
26. Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1985, at B1, col. 1.
27. Interview with Louis Forg6t, Legal Advisor, Policy and General Affairs, World
Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 6, 1986).
28. Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1986, at 37, col. 1.
29. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORA-
TION 4, 51 (Apr. 1985). For example, Chile recently was charged 8.8 percent interest
with a three year grace period and fifteen year maturity. Washington Post, Dec. 14,
1985, at BI, col. 2.
30. See WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 12 (stating that this
reduction was implemented on the understanding that the fee would be reinstated if the
funds derived from the fee become necessary for the Bank's fiscal security); see also
Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1985, at 20, col. 6 (stating same point).
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2. The New World Bank Cofinancing Initiative
The World Bank's traditional cofinancing involved an arrangement
whereby the Bank associated its funds with those funds provided by
sources external to the borrowing country."' Such arrangements failed,
however, to generate new commercial bank cofinancing funds.32 By the
early 1980's, there was a significant decline of private lending to the
Third World due in part to the worldwide recession. The Bank did not
foresee a resurgence in private lending under either traditional
cofinancing agreements or other standard lending methods. 3
Consequently, the World Bank announced a new cofinancing initia-
tive intended to increase flows of private capital to developing countries
in January 1983. Under this program, the World Bank acts as a co-
lender, directly funding or guaranteeing portions of the commercial
loan.m These loans, known as "B-loans," are contrasted with "A-
loans," the direct loans made for approved development projects. The
World Bank closely links this co-lending program to its own direct de-
velopment programs."'
Under the pilot program, the Executive Directors initially authorized
the World Bank to commit $500 million to as many as twenty lending
31. See generally TAYLOR, supra note I (providing a complete discussion of the
World Bank cofinancing program); Note, The World Bank's New Cofinancing Initia-
tives: Legal Mechanisms for Promoting Commercial Lending to Developing Countries,
15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 911 (1983) (discussing World Bank's expanded cofinanc-
ing program). The participants to a cofinancing program may associate loans infor-
mally, or the loans may be more complex, with provisions linking the sources of fund-
ing through a Memorandum of Agreement between the World Bank and the
commercial lenders. Note, supra at 919-20; see also WORLD BANK, COFINANCING 28
(1983) (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.) (noting that the World Bank
historically entered into cofinancing arrangements with three types of lending organiza-
tions: official bilateral development agencies; regional development banks; and multina-
tional commercial banks); TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that since mid-1973,
commercial banks cofinanced over 60 projects, extending $3.6 billion in association
with World Bank loans).
In the last decade, however, the World Bank's traditional cofinancing program only
partially filled the need for funds. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 19.
32. Interview with Anthony G. Toft, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1985).
33. A.W. Clausen, Corrective Initiatives in International Trade and Finance, State-
ment to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 8-9 (June 9, 1985)
(available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
34. WORLD BANK, COFINANCING 11 (1983) (available at the World Bank, Wash-
ington, D.C.).
35. Under the new cofinancing program the World Bank also extends an A-loan for
each development project receiving a B-loan jointly financed by the World Bank and
commercial lenders. H. Sasson, Cofinancing with the World Bank, 3 THE WORLD OF
BANKING 6 (Mar.-Apr. 1984).
[VOL. 1:391
WORLD BANK
operations. 6 The World Bank participated in thirteen B-loans in the
first 2 years of the new program. As of January 1986, the World
Bank committed $190.3 million of its own funds to the B-loan program.
Combined with $1,635.7 million from commercial lenders, $1,825 mil-
lion has been committed to the B-loan program.37 The target volume
for the three-year pilot program is $2 billion.38
The B-loan program authorizes four types of loan instruments
designed to assist and encourage private direct loans from commercial
lenders.39 First, the Bank as a co-lender may directly fund the later
maturities of a commercial loan.40 Second, the Bank may guarantee the
later maturities. Under this option the Bank may purchase the later
maturities at the request of the commercial lenders.41 Third, the Bank
may undertake a defined commitment to finance deferred principal at
fixed payment levels in the event of fluctuating interest rates. 2 Finally,
36. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 55-56. Half of the targeted
range of fifteen to twenty operations, with a volume of $I,051 million leveraged by
$130 million of World Bank funds, was reached in the first two years of the program.
Id.
37. World Bank, Record of World Bank B-loans by Fiscal Year of Signing (Jan.
1986) (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
38. Id. The target volume for the program apparently will not be reached in the
three year period. Id. The World Bank expressed satisfaction with the results of the
program thus far, noting:
The borrowers of the eleven B-loans signed thus far include one East European,
one East Asian, and three Latin American countries, all with varied market
standings. The sectoral distribution of B-loans encompasses agriculture, energy
and power, industry and telecommunications. The more than 160 participating
commercial banks have included a wide representation of major and smaller re-
gional banks from Europe, Japan, the Middle East, and North America.
WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 55.
39. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 55; TAYLOR, supra note 1, at
39.
40. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 40-42. The funding of late maturities is intended to
encourage private lenders to extend their maturities beyond what they would normally
offer, with the Vorld Bank funding an additional year or more. Id. B-loans made under
this option for projects in Hungary and Colombia featured World Bank funding of
maturities for two years beyond the period funded by commercial lenders. World Bank,
Record of World Bank B-loans by Fiscal Year of Signing (Jan. 1986) (available at the
World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
41. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 44 (noting that under this option, private lenders
wholly fund the maturities of the loan and the World Bank guarantees late maturities,
with the possibility to be released from all or part of its share); WOR. BANK, WORLD
BANK COFINANCING WITH COMMERCIAL BANKS: NOTE ON THE NEW INSTRUMENTS 10
(Sept. 30, 1983) (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.)(observing that if
the Bank is obligated to fund the late maturities, it is subrogated to the rights of the
commercial lender to seek reimbursement from the borrower).
42. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 45. Installment payments combining interest and
principal are fixed at a certain level. Id. If interest rates rise above the fixed level of the
installments, leaving an unpaid amount at the end of the scheduled period of payments.
the World Bank is obligated to finance the final repayment if the lender is not willing
1986]
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the World Bank may sell participation rights in loans it negotiates to
commercial lenders under the arrangement.
4 3
All parties to a B-loan benefit from the transaction. The commercial
co-lenders benefit from the World Bank's informational and structural
umbrella, particularly the World Bank's expertise in identifying high-
priority, well-conceived projects. 44 The Bank's involvement in the trans-
action creates the perception that these are "quality loans."40 More-
over, the lenders benefit from the "special relationship" between the
World Bank and the borrowing country, namely, the flexibility and
ability of the World Bank to work with borrowers in the event that
they cannot repay loans.46 The new cofinancing program, therefore,
creates an incentive for private lenders to fill a "financing gap."'47 De-
velopment projects still must meet World Bank standards, 48 but be-
cause the World Bank itself cannot provide sufficient funds to carry out
the projects, the program encourages private lenders to lend funds to
developing countries.'
9
The new cofinancing program provides two primary benefits to bor-
rowing countries. First, the program increases their familiarity with,
and access to, commercial markets. 50 Second, B-loans provide better
terms to borrowers; the World Bank calls this significant "additional-
ity" over terms a borrower would otherwise receive. "Additionality" in-
cludes lengthened maturity and grace periods, lower spreads and fees,
the availability of increased amounts of available funds, and a renewed
willingness on the part of commercial banks to lend to developing coun-
to do so. Id. at 44; World Bank, Record of World Bank B-loans by Fiscal Year of
Signing (Jan. 1986) (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
43. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that the sale of participations method
of cofinancing has not been used to date under the B-loan program).
44. See WORLD BANK, COFINANCING 2 (1983) (available at the World Bank,
Washington, D.C.) (stating that commercial lenders believe that loans extended to a
well-conceived World Bank development project will have a greater chance of being
repaid).
45. Interview with Anthony G. Toft, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1985).
46. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 52. Although the Bank will make arrangements to
avoid default by the borrowing entity, it is the World Bank's policy not to take part in
debt rescheduling arrangements. Id.
47. Interview with Anthony G. Toft, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1985).
48. See Note, supra note 31, at 929 (noting "Bank-approved development
projects").
49. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 39-40.
50. See Id. at 39-40 (discussing how the B-loan program generally helps developing




tries." As a result, the terms of a B-loan are more suited to both in-
creased development project financing and the borrower's ability to re-
pay the loan.
52
World Bank officials and most observers view the second funding in-
strument-the guarantee of later maturities of a loan-as having the
greatest potential to increase private lending. This is particularly true
given the World Bank's limited resources for making direct loans. Thus
far, however, the guarantee option has been used only in Paraguay and
Chile.54
The recent loan to the Republic of Chile, signed on November 1,
1985, evidences a new development in the B-loan program.,5 The B-
loan provides what might be considered as balance of payments assis-
tance to Chile. Under this arrangement, the World Bank guaranteed
fifty percent of a $300 million loan for a road investment and mainte-
nance project, that in turn, financed part of a New Money Facility with
the Central Bank of Chile."6 This type of broader financial assistance
provides a model for Brazil, Mexico and other developing countries
where fluctuating interest rates and commodity price levels frequently
impede long-term development.
a. Structuring the B-loan
Either the borrowing country or the commercial lender may ap-
proach the World Bank to arrange a B-loan. The commercial lender
performs the managerial and agency functions typical of syndicated
credit lending58 and drafts the documents formalizing the loan. The
Bank then reviews both the terms of the loan and the loan documents
51. See H. Sasson, Cofinancing with the World Bank, 3 THE WORLD OF BANKING
7 (Mar.-Apr. 1984).
52. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that the World Bank works with po-
tential borrowers in identifying projects and, as with traditional cofinancing, helps pub-
licize those lending opportunities to commercial banks and other lenders).
53. Interview with Anthony G. Toft, Legal Department. World Bank, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1985).
54. World Bank, Record of World Bank B-loans by Fiscal Year of Signing (Jan.
1986) (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
55. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1985, at 46, col. 4.
56. World Bank, Chile: Road Sector Project: Cofinanced USS300 Million Syndi-
cated Loan Facility With a Partial World Bank Guarantee: Summary of Terms and
Conditions 1 (Nov. 1, 1985) (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.) (noting
that the total amount committed under the New Money Facility is S785 million, and is
intended to finance part of the "foreign and local currency expenditures" for the first
three years of the road sector program).
57. WORLD BANK, COFINANCING 16 (1983) (available at the World Bank, Wash-
ington, D.C.).
58. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 48.
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to ensure their consistency with World Bank policies. 9 Loan docu-
ments incorporate clauses regarding procurement of goods and services,
procedures for disbursement and drawdown, repayment terms and
other aspects of the loan. "Tombstone" advertisements, similar to those
used in security offerings in the United States, are published by the
lead bank to notify the international financial community of the loan
and to solicit broader participation.60 Cross-default clauses in the loan
instruments are a source of comfort to commercial banks in cofinancing
arrangements because they give both the World Bank and the private
lender the right to take action if a borrower defaults on its loan obliga-
tions to either lender.61 Many commercial lenders, however, criticize
the World Bank's narrow interpretation of the cross-default clauses and
its refusal to accept mandatory cross-default clauses. 62 As with a tradi-
tional cofinancing arrangement, the cofinanced loan may be declared in
default if the World Bank accelerates its parallel A-loans for the pro-
ject or "if there is material debt service failure to the World Bank by
the borrower or guarantor, if any."' 63 Thus, there are limits on the
World Bank's recognition of cross-default clauses. Officials emphasize
that the World Bank's participation in the B-loan program is not in-
tended to fully guarantee the commercial barnks from any losses.6' The
advantages to commercial banks of closer association with the World
Bank under the B-loan program, however, create sufficient incentives
for mutually advantageous lending.6
59. Id.
60. World Bank, Chile: Road Sector Project: Cofinanced U.S. $300 Million Syndi-
cated Loan Facility With a Partial World Bank Guarantee: Summary of Terms and
Conditions (Nov. 1, 1985) (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
61. Note, supra note 31, at 920. For example, the November, 1985 loan to Chile
limited cross-default to World Bank loans to the following contingencies: payment de-
faults in excess of $5 million that continues for at least 45 consecutive days, or acceler-
ation by the World Bank under the relevant loan. Moreover, any event that results in
suspension or acceleration of the B-loan gives the World Bank the option to suspend
disbursements or accelerate maturities under the A-loan. See World Bank, Chile: Road
Sector Project: Cofinanced U.S. $300 Million Syndicated Loan Facility With a Partial
World Bank Guarantee: Summary of Terms and Conditions (Nov. 1, 1985) (available
at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.).
62. See Note, supra note 31, at 924-25 (noting that although the Bank refuses to
accept mandatory cross-default clauses, it retains the option of accelerating A-loans in
response to default under the B-loan); see also WORLD BANK, COFINANCING 16 (1983)
(available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.) (stating the Bank refuses to accept
mandatory cross-default clauses).
63. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 59.
64. Interview with Anthony G. Toft, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1985).
65. TAYLOR, supra note I, at 39.
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b. Potential Liabilities to the World Bank Under the New Cofinanc-
ing Program
Three types of legal liability may emerge from the World Bank's
pilot cofinancing program. The first potentially troublesome aspect of
the new arrangement concerns the World Bank requirement under the
Articles of Agreement that a member government territory guarantee a
World Bank loan.66 Whether a similar guarantee is extended to the
commercial bank portion of the loan is a separate matter negotiated
between the borrower and the commercial lender. If the World Bank
portion of the loan is guaranteed, and the commercial lender's portion
is not, problems may arise. For example, debt service payments nor-
mally are shared on a pro-rata basis in syndicate credit operations. 7 If
the World Bank were to share payments received on the basis of its
guarantee with the commercial lender, the World Bank would be de-
prived of the full amount of the guarantee by the member government.
A voluntary sharing of guarantee payments with co-lenders would re-
quire the World Bank to reduce its assets in violation of the Articles of
Agreement. Further, if the Bank were to share guarantee payments
with commercial lenders, this would result in "an indirect partial guar-
antee of the commercial bank portion, in circumstances where the
member country intended that no guarantee be given directly to the
commercial lenders." 68 World Bank practice to date has been to refuse
to share payments from guaranteeing members with commercial lend-
ers.69 Commercial bankers may attempt to recover their portion of pay-
ments through set-off or other means."0
A second source of potential liability is the possibility of a suit based
66. Id. at 57. For example, the Hungarian People's Republic, a member of the
World Bank, guaranteed a loan signed in June 1985 to the National Bank of Hungary
for agricultural, chemical and transport projects. Id. See also World Bank, Hungary:
Integrated Livestock Industry Project, Fine Chemicals and Transport (Road/Rail)
Project: Cofinanced $300 Million Syndicated Loan: Summary of Terms and Conditions
3 (June 19, 1985) (available from the World Bank, Washington, D.C.) (observing that
the guarantee only extended to the World Bank participation).
67. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 55.
68. Id. at 57.
69. Id. Although the Bank will not extend any guarantees, it generally works
closely with the commercial lender, sharing information regarding any developments
that may interfere with repayment of the loan. Id. at 57-58.
70. Interview with Anthony G. Tort, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1985); TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 57. This aspect of the loan may
also be expressed more formally in a "mutual non-sharing clause," where the lenders
agree that commercial lenders may retain any amounts received from the bor-
rower-through set-off of the borrower's other assets-until the amount recovered by
the commercial bank equals that received by the World Bank under the latter's guar-
antee. Id.
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on the World Bank's participation in loan arrangements and guaran-
tees. As an international organization, the World Bank is not immune
from suit arising from its actions in loan arrangements. Therefore, it
eschews the role of manager or lead agent for the lending syndicate,
thus reducing its potential liabilities in the project.7 1 The syndication
agreement for the B-loan includes language similar to that used in nor-
mal commercial agreements. It states that each co-lender has made his
own investigation of the project and invests "with his eyes open."1 2 The
World Bank, in short, rejects any express or implied warranties associ-
ated with the project.
7 '
The third potential area of liability is the requirement in the IBRD
Articles of Agreement that the World Bank has an express duty to use
"the resources and facilities of the Bank. .. exclusively for the benefit
of members. 17 4 The Articles require that the terms of World Bank
loans be "reasonable" and "appropriate. '7 5 Cofinancing arrangements
intended to provide incentives to commercial banks, and which are ex-
tended at commercial rates, although on highly favorable terms, might
not satisfy these requirements. The Articles of Agreement, however,
are worded broadly on this point so it is not a likely source of
liability.
7 6
c. Prospects for the New Cofinancing Program
The new cofinancing program is accomplishing its goal of stimulating
increased levels of private commercial investment in developing coun-
tries at terms favorable to borrowers. 7 Member countries of the World
Bank, as well as World Bank officials, are voicing their support for this
new initiative. 8 Moreover, the Reagan Administration is providing
strong support for the World Bank's B-loan program. In particular,
United States Secretary of the Treasury, James A. Baker, called for an
additional $20 billion in new lending to developing nations from com-
71. Note, supra note 31, at 950.
72. Interview with Anthony G. Toft, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 31, 1985).
73. Note, supra note 31, at 949.
74. IBRD Articles, supra note 15, at art. III, § 1(a).
75. Id. at art. 1(2).
76. See Note, supra note 31, at 949 (stating that to date, this question has not been
publicly raised).
77. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 55.
78. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Fi-
nance Corporation and International Development Association, 1984 Annual Meetings




mercial banks at the October 1985 meeting of the Governors of the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Seoul, South Ko-
rea.79 In turn, United States banks' reaction to the B-loan program is
positive, because of their already heavy financial commitments in devel-
oping countries and their desire to obtain more secure investments. 0
The new B-loan program plays a vital role in promoting such invest-
ment, considering the need for increased funding and the limits on the
World Bank's own resources.
3. Structural Adjustment Loans and the Increase in Non-Project De-
velopment Loans
The World Bank generally interprets its Articles of Agreement to
limit Bank lending to specific types of development projects.8' Histori-
cally, however, the Bank made exceptions for four special types of
"non-project" loans.82 The scope of this "non-project" lending has ex-
panded greatly in recent years with the introduction of structural ad-
justment loans (SALs). 3 SALS now account for fifteen to twenty per-
cent of all Bank lending.8'
Structural adjustment loans focus on macroeconomic issues and are
designed to encourage changes in the national policy and institutional
structures of a borrowing country. These changes attempt to maximize
the efficient use of economic resources and to achieve sustained eco-
nomic growth.8 5 Essentially, SALs have four specific goals: (1) elimi-
nating or reducing state enterprises; (2) opening protected industries;
(3) easing restrictions on private foreign capital investments; 80 and (4)
stopping the flight of domestic capital from the borrowing country.87 In
addition to providing the necessary funds through SAL's to achieve a
79. Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1985, at Fl, col. 1
80. Id.
81. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORA-
TIoN 32 (Apr. 1985).
82. Id. These four exceptions are: 1) the reconstruction or rehabilitation of an econ-
omy after a calamity like war, earthquake or flood where the quick transfer of external
resources is needed to restore normal development activities; 2) the import of supplies
and equipment so that existing domestic production capacity can be fully used; 3) ac-
commodations for a sudden fall in export earnings in an economy that is critically
dependent on a single item of export; and 4) compensation for a sharp deterioration in
the balance of trade because of a rapid rise in import prices. Id.
83. See WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 52 (noting that from
1980 to 1985 the Bank approved thirty-one operations in support of structural adjust-
ment programs in seventeen countries for a total commitment of $4.5 billion).
84. Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1985, at E2, col. 3.
85. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
86. Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
87. Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1985, at A2, col. 4.
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more sound macroeconomic policy, the Bank's legal department stud-
ies, proposes, and helps draft national legislation designed to achieve
these goals.18
The World Bank initiated a particularly large SAL project, entitled
the Special Facility for Sub-Saharan Africa, in February 1985. With
the aid of fourteen donor countries, the Bank will provide $1.2 billion
over three years to assist approximately twenty-one African countries
that are undertaking difficult economic policy reforms.89
Structural adjustment loans will be a successful vehicle for improv-
ing economic performance according to preliminary indications. In his
1985 Annual Address to the Bank's Boards of Governors, Bank Presi-
dent A.W. Clausen listed nine specific structural adjustments that ap-
pear to be successful in the countries adopting them.90 These adjust-
ments include reduced consumer subsidies, installation of market
interest rates, raised produce prices, devaluation of exchange rates, in-
creased domestic savings, reduced economic distortions, and greater
freedom of action for private and public economic agents. Continued
improvements in each of these areas will contribute to making develop-
ing countries financially sound and more attractive to commercial lend-
ers, allowing for graduation from World Bank assistance.
4. Graduation from Eligibility for World Bank Loans
Only countries that cannot obtain a loan on reasonable terms in the
private capital market may borrow from the World Bank.9 1 Through a
process called graduation, the World Bank phases out those borrowers
who achieve a level of development and management capability that
permits them access to other capital markets. Once a Bank member is
able to borrow in the world's markets, it is ineligible for further World
Bank development loans. 2
88. See WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 52-53 (observing that the
World Bank refers to such assistance and loan supervision as "policy dialogue"); DE-
VELOPMENT COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 63 (noting that borrowing countries, how-
ever, call it "conditional lending," i.e., lending "conditioned" on economic, institutional
and/or sectoral reforms in the borrowing country).
89. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25.
90. Address by A.W. Clausen, President of the World Bank, to the Boards of Gov-
ernors, in Seoul, Korea at 11 (Oct. 8, 1985) (available at the World Bank, Washing-
ton, D.C.).
91. IBRD Articles, supra note 15, at art. III(4)(ii).
92. The following countries are graduate members: France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Israel, Singapore,
Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Japan. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 8 (Apr. 1985). Japan, who borrowed from the IBRD
for 14 years, is now one of the Bank Group's largest sources of borrowing. Id.
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In 1985, the Bank's executive directors adopted a new Statement on
Graduation. 3 Resolving a policy debate between the Bank and several
high income countries, 94 the statement establishes a clear yet flexible
set of guidelines for determining when a member nation is ineligible for
World Bank loans. In order to reach a consensus, the executive direc-
tors designed the guidelines to accommodate the circumstances of an
individual country.95
The Bank set a per capita GNP of $2,650 as the graduation bench-
mark.9 6 Graduation will normally occur within five years after a coun-
try reaches that level so long as its GNP does not fall below the bench-
mark level. Graduated members may still request technical assistance,
send students to the Bank's training institutes, and borrow from the
IFC.97
In the past two years, the Bank successfully raised capital and en-
couraged commercial lenders to participate in Bank loans through the
new cofinancing initiative. It also successfully instituted macroeconomic
policies through the use of structural adjustment loans. In many re-
spects, the Bank achieves its goals and facilitates development through
financing increasingly diverse projects. These projects, however, are not
always without controversy.
II. CRITICISMS OF WORLD BANK DEVELOPEMNT
PROJECTS
In the past two years, several World Bank development projects
faced a broad range of criticisms. Projects attracting the most criti-
cisms include: World Bank funding of migration and resettlement
schemes in Indonesia and Bangladesh, a development project in Bra-
zil,98 and the CGIAR world seed storage system.99
93. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 12.
94. Id.
95. World Bank, Graduation (Mar. 23, 1982)(available at the World Bank, Wash-
ington, D.C.); Letter from Bill Brannigan, World Bank Information and Public Affairs
Office (Jan. 28, 1986)(available at the editorial offices of the American University
Journal of International Law and Policy, Washington, D.C.).
96. Id.
97. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORA-
TION 8 (Apr. 1985).
98. See Washington Post, Oct. 6, 1985, at D7, col. 1; Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1985, p.
25, col. 2. (noting that the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee who
determines United States contributions to multilateral development agencies spoke out
against the Bank's Brazilian Polonoreste project, a plan to carve out 900 miles of high-
way in the Amazon Rain Forest and create farmlands). The original Bank loan agree-
ment with Brazil noted that the rights of the indigenous Indians were to be respected.
Nevertheless, much violence between the resettled farmers and the Indians was re-
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Regarding the migration situation in Indonesian-West Papua, 100
spokespersons claiming to represent the West Papuans asserted that the
chief objective of the Indonesian government in occupying West Papua,
a territory rich in minerals, petroleum, gas, and agricultural lands, was
to use West Papuan land to resettle impoverished Javans.101 These
spokepersons reported to a United Nations Committee that, to accom-
plish their goal, Indonesia seized the land of native Papuans, settled the
West Papuans elsewhere, and then brought in migrants from Java.
102
Though undertaken in the name of development, this forced migration
left West Papuans considerably worse off than they were under Dutch
colonial rule. As a result, over 16,000 West Papuans fled to New
Guinea.103
ported and charges were made that the soil was unacceptable for farming and the
destruction of vast acres of rain forest was an environmental debacle. Id. The Bank
interrupted disbursements to the Polonoreste project in the midst of these protestations
but not in direct response to the environmental and human rights protests. Id. The
Bank resumed the disbursements after Brazil adopted a plan of action regarding future
administration of the project that met the Bank's satisfaction. Brannigan Responses 1,
supra note 3.
99. Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1985, at A3, col. I. The World Bank is a major
sponsor for the present international germplasm program conducted by the Consultive
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) organized in May 1971. Id.
Third World countries have charged that the industrialized countries have exploited
their donations of seed samples through agricultural hybridization and plant germ
plasm biotechnological developments now generating commercial revenues not shared
with less developed country donors. Id. To date, the Bank has not taken a position on
the accusations. Brannigan Responses I, supra note 3.
100. Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights, Report for 1984 to
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations "West Papau" (availa-
ble from the Anti-Slavery Society, 180 Brixton Road, London, SW9, U.K.) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Anti-Slavery Society, Report for 1984]. When the Netherlands withdrew
from their colonies in the region, the fate of West Papua became a matter of negotia-
tion among the Dutch, Indonesian, and United States governments. Id. No West
Papuans participated in the discussion to determine the future of their homeland. Id. In
1962, the parties reached the New York Agreement, making Indonesia the administra-
tor of the territory subject to a plebiscite being carried out on the basis of one man one
vote as recommended by Article XXIII of the United Nations Charter. Id. Only 1,025
specially selected Papuans held voting rights. Id.
101. Statement on Behalf of the Free Papua Movement (West Papuan Peoples'
Movement for Freedom and Independence), 37 U.N. ESCOR (Third Session, Working
Group on Indigenous Populations at Geneva, August 1, 1984). See generally Commis-
sion on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, Problem of Discrimination
Against Indigenous Population: Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions on its Third Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/20 (Aug. 8, 1984)
(describing generally the Free Papua Movement).
102. Id.
103. Statement on Behalf of the Anti-Slavery Society, West Papuan Refugees, 37
U.N. ESCOR (Geneva, 1984); Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social
Council, Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Population Report of the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Third Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1984/20 (Aug. 8, 1984).
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In 1985, the Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human
Rights leveled similar criticisms of Bank development projects in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh.104 The Bangladesh government
is resettling large numbers of people on the lands of indigenous popula-
tions. Such resettlement often causes the indigenous population to flee,
virtually destroying their culture. The Anti-Slavery Society estimates
that in 1981, there were at least fourteen refugee camps in India made
up of displaced Chittagong Hill Tract tribes. 05
The Bank handles complaints about projects through a number of
channels. In general, the Bank assigns several different units to investi-
gate charges. These units include the regional division responsible for
the project, the Public Affairs Unit and possibly the Operations Evalu-
ation Department (OED).106 World Bank President, A.W. Clausen,
stated that when evaluating a development project, the Bank should
take into account non-financial considerations as well as purely eco-
nomic quantitative analysis.10 7 Moreover, the Bank's Operations Evalu-
ation staff is working presently to increase borrower participation in its
formal, after completion project evaluation process.108
If the new Bank President shares Mr. Clausen's philosophy, observ-
ers should expect to see more constructive criticism of Bank projects
from within the World Bank group itself. Overall, however, the Bank
enjoys a sterling reputation and continues to receive new applications
for membership.
104. Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights, Report for 1985 to
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations: The Situation of Ref-
ugeesfrom the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and from West Papua I (availa-
ble from the Society, 180 Brixton Road, London, SW9, U.K.).
105. Id. at 98.
106. Brannigan Responses I, supra note 3.
107. Clausen, CORRECTIVE INITIATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE
(statement to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 8-9) (June 9,
1985) (available at the World Bank, Washington, D.C.). In 1980, the Bank advanced
an International Declaration on the Environment through which eleven major develop-
ment assistance agencies agreed to harmonize their policies and practices with careful
regard for the environment. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 72-74.
In a related development, the Bank has issued new and stronger guidelines governing
chemical pesticides. Id. The Bank also distributes charts depicting the "Do's and
Don'ts" of pesticide use. Id. These charts are capable of comprehension by the illiter-
ate. Id. Furthermore, the Bank offers a short course on protecting the general public
and the environment. Id. In an effort to prevent disasters such as the toxic gas release
in Bhopal and the natural gas explosion near Mexico City, the Bank issued guidelines
in 1984 requiring borrowers to demonstrate that such hazards have been recognized
and measures will be taken for their prevention. Id. at 73.
108. WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 62.
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III. CHANGES IN WORLD BANK MEMBERSHIP,
ADMINISTRATION AND LEGAL MATTERS
A. FOUR COUNTRIES BECOME BANK'S NEWEST MEMBERS
In the past two years, the Bank accepted St. Christopher and Nevis,
Mozambique, Hungary, and Tonga as new members.109 Membership in
the IMF is a prerequisite to World Bank membership." 0 Each new
member must subscribe to the Bank's capitalization based on its IMF
quota."' Part of each member's obligation is due immediately and the
remaining subscription is "on call" and must be made available should
the Bank need it."a2 Currently, approximately ten percent of the sub-
scription is due upon acceptance to the World Bank." 3
Each new member is entitled to appoint one Governor and one alter-
nate to serve on the Bank's Board of Governors. 14 Mozambique, Hun-
gary and Tonga have also joined the the IDA and the IFC. St. Christo-
pher and Nevis is awaiting action on its membership application to the
IDA."15
B. THE WORLD BANK PRESIDENCY IN TRANSITION
The President of the World Bank Group also serves as the Chief
Executive Officer of the IBRD and the IDA."' Although the Bank's
Articles of Agreement states that the Bank's Executive Directors select
the World Bank President, through tradition and understanding, the
United States Government always selects the President.1 7 The Presi-
109. See Letter from Bill Brannigan, World Bank Information and Public Affairs
Office to Jane D. Weaver (Jan. 28, 1986) (available at the editorial offices of the
American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Washington, D.C.) (ob-
serving that applications from Poland and Kiribati are pending, awaiting IMF action).
110. IBRD Articles, supra note 15, at art. II(1).
111. Brannigan Responses I, supra note 3; DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, supra note
15, at 58.
112. IBRD Articles, supra note 13, at art. 11(3).
113. Letter from Bill Brannigan, World Bank Information and Public Affairs Of-
fice to Jane D. Weaver (Jan. 28, 1986) (available at the editorial offices of the Ameri-
can University Journal of International Law and Policy, Washington, D.C.).
114. IBRD Articles, supra note 15, at art. V(2). The Bank's Board of Governors
has the powers of decision on membership, distribution of net income and changes in
capital stock. Id. at art. V(2)(b).
115. See Letter from Bill Brannigan, World Bank Information and Public Affairs
Office to Jane D. Weaver (Jan. 28, 1986)(stating that Portugal also has an IDA appli-
cation pending).
116. IBRD Articles, supra note 15, at art. V(5); See also Articles of Agreement of
the International Development Association, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1960, art.
VI(5), 11 U.S.T. 22, T.I.A.S. 46.




dent's term of office is five years. The current president, A.W. Clausen,
announced that he will retire at the end of his term in June 1986.118
President Reagan appointed former Congressman Barber B. Conable to
be Mr. Clausen's successor.119 The following final section discusses re-
cent caselaw involving the World Bank and the Bank's creation of an
Administrative Tribunal.
C. LEGAL DEPARTMENT AFFAIRS: THE MENDARO CASE AND THE
NEW WORLD BANK ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Recently, the issue concerning the World Bank's jurisdictional im-
munity status was litigated another time. Susan Mendaro, a World
Bank employee, claimed she was discriminated against when her super-
visors refused to provide her with the same number of assignments as
her male co-workers, thwarted her efforts to complete assignments, per-
mitted unwarranted verbal and physical advances to her, and refused to
promote her appropriately. 20 In 1979, the United States Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission dismissed her initial complaint on
the grounds that the World Bank is an international agency and thus
not subject to the laws of the United States. 21 Mendaro subsequently
directed her grievance to a United States federal court and brought
suit alleging sex discrimination.122
Mendaro asserted that the World Bank's Articles of Agreement
23
waived any immunity bestowed on it 24 under the International Organi-
zations Immunities Act. 125 Mendaro relied on the reasoning in Lutcher
S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Development Bank
118. Address by A.W. Clausen, President of the World Bank, to the Boards of
Governors, in Seoul, Korea (Oct. 8, 1985).
119. Washington Post, Mar. 14, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
120. Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. IBRD Articles, supra note 15, at art. VII, § 3. Article VII, section 3 of the
IBRD Articles of Agreement permits actions to be brought against the Bank:
in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the
Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service
or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. No actions shall,
however, be brought by members or persons acting for or deriving claims from
members. The property and assets of the Bank shall, wheresoever located and by
whomsoever held, be immune from all forms of seizure, attachment, or execution
before the delivery of final judgement against the Bank.
Id.
124. Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Exec. Order
No. 9,751, 3 C.F.R. 558 (1943-48 Comp.) and Exec. Order No. 11,966, 42 Fed. Reg.
4331 (1977)(discussing the IDA).
125. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288e (1982
and Supp. 1 1983).
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(Lutcher).128 In Lutcher, the Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia construed an identical waiver provision in the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank's Articles of Agreement as a waiver of immunity to
suits brought by bondholders, creditors and beneficiaries of creditors.
While acknowledging that the Bank's charter contained a facially
broad waiver of immunity, the court in Mendaro held that the World
Bank did not waive its immunity from suits brought by employees. In
affirming its Lutcher analysis, the court distinguished employment rela-
tions from external commercial activities, citing additional cases that
denied jurisdiction over employment claims of international civil
servants.
127
The World Bank also has been named as a defendant in lawsuits in
six countries: Bangladesh, India, United Kingdom, France and
Belgium, 128 as well as several times in the United States. In each case,
the courts held the Bank immune or not subject to the court's
jurisdiction. 12 9
While the court in Mendaro noted the conditional nature of the im-
munity conferred by the International Organizations Immunities
Act,130 the opinion was critized as indicating courts' unwillingness to
search for remedies for denial of equal protection to employees working
within the United States.31
In 1980, the World Bank established an Administrative Tribunal
consisting of seven judges appointed by the Bank's Executive Direc-
tors.13 2 The primary factor prompting this tribunal was the need for a
larger, more formalized grievance procedure in light of the tremendous
126. Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Development Bank, 382
F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
127. Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 614-16, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see
also Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org., 668 F.2d 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that
where employment claims did not arise from commercial activity of international or-
ganization, organization is immune if either restrictive immunity or absolute immunity
applies); Broadbent v. OAS, 628 F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that OAS is
immune from suit brought by employee alleging breach of employment contracts,
where internal administration of OAS is non-commercial and elaborate grievance pro-
cedure was in place); Weidner v. INTELSAT, 392 A.2d 508, 510 (D.C. App. 1978)
(holding that INTELSAT is immune from suit, as an international organization meet-
ing criteria set forth in International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288
(Supp. IV, 1974); Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(holding that World Bank is not subject to National Labor Relations Act).
128. Brannigan Responses I, supra note 3.
129. Id.
130. Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
131. Comment, How Much Immunity for International Organizations? Mendaro
v. World Bank, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 487, 494 (1985).




expansion of the World Bank staff.13 3 Some legal analysts speculate
that a second motivation for the formation of the World Bank Admin-
istrative Tribunal was to guard against nations asserting jurisdiction
over the Bank's internal operations. 3 '
CONCLUSION
The World Bank embarked in recent years on new initiatives in fi-
nancing development projects. Its pilot "B-loan" program encourages
direct loans by commercial banks and other funding institutions to
projects in which the World Bank participates as a co-lender or guar-
antor. Moreover, structural adjustment loans, graduation programs and
similar policies help achieve long-term economic health for member
countries. Such initiatives may result in a new and greater role for the
World Bank in the international economic system.
The World Bank is experiencing controversy in its external and in-
ternal affairs. Allegations of human rights violations associated with
World Bank projects in Indonesia and Bangladesh are being investi-
gated through official channels. Employee suits brought against the
World Bank are resulting in findings by courts that the World Bank is
immune from suit as an international organization. The recent estab-
lishment of an Administrative Tribunal, and the beginning of the term




133. See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
CORPORATION 65 (Apr. 1985) (listing World Bank as currently employing approxi-
mately 5,800 employees with resident missions in more than 30 countries).
134. See Meron and Elder, New Administrative Tribunal of the World Bank, 14
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 2 (1981) (noting Bank's insistence on immunity from
jurisdiction of national courts in employment-related cases); EJ. de Arechaga, The
World Bank Administrative Tribunal, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 895, 897 (1982)
(speculating that Bank's administrative tribunal initiative was in response to uncer-
tainty of Bank's immunity from suit in national tribunals); C. Amerasinght, World
Bank Adminstrative Tribunal, 31 INT'L & Cohip. L.Q. 748, 748-52 (1982) (recogniz-
ing need for judicial machinery in Bank structure to settle disputes in staff matters).
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